DNS

DNSSEC Checker

Validate the DNSSEC chain of trust — DNSKEY, DS record and RRSIG verification.

About DNSSEC Check

Walks the DNSSEC chain of trust for a domain from the root down through each delegation, verifying that DS and DNSKEY records match at every level and that signatures are valid and unexpired. DNSSEC failures are notoriously hard to debug by hand because a broken link anywhere in the chain causes validating resolvers to silently refuse to resolve the domain at all, with no obvious error message. Worth running after rotating DNSSEC keys, changing registrars, or when a domain mysteriously stops resolving for some users but not others.

Because this walks the chain the same way a public validating resolver would, it can catch a break that checking your own authoritative server config alone would miss — the two aren't always testing the same thing.

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DNSSEC Chain

DNSKEY -- Public key published at the zone apex
DS -- Delegation Signer at the parent zone
RRSIG -- Signature over DNS records
AD flag -- Resolver confirms chain is valid

Related Tools

Secure, insecure, bogus: what the result means

A validating resolver puts every answer into one of three states, and the difference decides whether your domain resolves at all:

  • Secure — the chain from the root down to your records verifies. Resolvers set the AD (Authenticated Data) flag.
  • Insecure — the domain is not signed, or the parent zone has no DS record for it. It resolves normally, just without DNSSEC protection. This is not an error.
  • Bogus — the domain claims to be signed, but something in the chain does not verify. Validating resolvers return SERVFAIL and the domain disappears for their users, while non-validating resolvers still answer. That split is why DNSSEC failures look like "it works for me but not for them".

The most common failures

  • DS record does not match any DNSKEY. The classic cause is moving to a new DNS provider, or rolling the key-signing key, without updating the DS record at the registrar. The parent still points at the old key, so the chain breaks at the delegation.
  • Expired signatures. RRSIG records carry an expiry date. If the signing process stops — a failed cron job, a stopped signer, a migrated server — signatures quietly run out days or weeks later and the zone turns bogus with no configuration change at all.
  • Signed zone, nameserver mismatch. One authoritative server serves signed data and another serves an unsigned or outdated copy. Results then depend on which server a resolver happens to ask.
  • Deprecated algorithms. Zones still signed with RSA/SHA-1 (algorithms 5 and 7) should be re-signed. ECDSA P-256 (algorithm 13) is the common modern choice: small keys, small responses.

Confirming a DNSSEC problem with dig

If a domain returns SERVFAIL, ask again with validation disabled:

dig example.com A            # SERVFAIL through a validating resolver
dig example.com A +cd        # +cd = checking disabled

If the +cd query returns a normal answer, the records themselves are fine and DNSSEC validation is what is failing. To see both sides of the delegation, compare the DS record at the parent with the keys in the zone:

dig example.com DS +short
dig example.com DNSKEY +multiline

The DS key tag must match the key tag of a DNSKEY with flags 257 (the key-signing key).

Turning DNSSEC off safely

Order matters. Remove the DS record at the registrar first, then wait at least the DS record's TTL — often a day at the parent zone — before unsigning the zone or moving to a provider that will not sign it. Doing it the other way round leaves the parent vouching for keys that no longer exist, and the domain goes dark for every validating resolver.

DNSSEC is one of the checks in the full NODA domain health assessment, which also covers nameserver delegation and mail authentication. To inspect individual records, use the DNS lookup tool.